The Rajah-Moonje Pact: Documents on a Forgotten Chapter of Indian History

Introduction

In 1932, in the wake of the second Round Table Conference, two pacts were concluded in quick succession between leaders of caste Hindus and the Depressed Classes. Both were intended to counter colonial ploys to wrench the Depressed Classes from Hindu society and thereby stymie the nationalist upsurge. While the Poona Pact, associated with Mahatma Gandhi and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, acquired a landmark status in modern Indian history, the earlier Rajah-Moonje Pact, espousing identical principles, has been all but eclipsed in popular memory.

This is somewhat perplexing, given that the British themselves had then grasped the import of the accord between M.C. Rajah, President of the All India Depressed Classes Association, and B.S. Moonje of the Hindu Mahasabha. Though maintaining official silence, they closely monitored the fallout of the Pact. One indicator of their concern was the file maintained on the Pact in the Government of India Reforms Office (N.A.I.: File No. 111/32-R). Its very title. “Representation of Depressed Classes in the future Legislature

Issue of joint vs. separate electorates – Raja-Moonje Pact.” bears witness to British awareness of the significance of the accord.

Curiously, in a departure from routine practice, no duplicate was made of this file which opens with the Secretary of State.

Sir Samuel Hoare’s, telegram of 1 March 1932 to the Viceroy asking for details of the Pact and the level of support it enjoyed. Immediately following are several pages of typed and handwritten correspondence of senior British officials on the matter. Why British officialdom chose not to follow the norm of preparing printed copies of this file remains inexplicable. Suffice it to note that the file contains the original copies of several important documents. Were it to disintegrate or be damaged in any way the documents would be lost forever.

The file additionally contains memorandums and letters submitted by Depressed Class leaders to high-ranking British authorities in the wake of the Round Table Conferences in London. Also appended are over fourty pages of clippings from leading English language newspapers on events related to the Pact, testimony to the wide coverage it received.

Announced in February 1932 amidst a raging controversy on the appropriate means of ensuring representation to the Depressed Classes in the provincial legislatures, the Rajah- Moonje Pact was the first ever agreement on reservations and a joint electorate between caste Hindus and the Depressed Classes. In its outright rejection of separate electorates then advocated by the British and Dr. Ambedkar, it was a blow to divisive colonial politics and Ambedkar’s assertions to Depressed Class leadership.

By then M.C. Rajah’s seniority and credentials as a Depressed Class leader had been well established. In 1916, over a year before Ambedkar’s return to India on completion of his studies abroad, Rajah had been appointed secretary of the Adi-Dravida Mahajan Sabha in Madras Presidency. In 1917, he had negotiated a pact with Dr. T.M. Nair of the Justice Party, to safeguard the interests of the Depressed Classes in the Presidency. Rajah was the first Depressed Class leader to be nominated to the Madras Legislative Council in 1920. In 1922, he had successfully moved a resolution in the legislature

that the name “Pariah” be dropped in favour of “Adi-Dravida” and “Adi-Andhra” in the Tamil and Telugu districts respectively. In 1927. Rajah was nominated to the Indian Legislative Assembly, the first Depressed Class leader to be so honoured. He had been elected President of the All India Depressed Classes Association in 1928 when Ambedkar was invited to serve as Vice-President. Rajah’s “The Oppressed Hindus,” published in 1925, was the first work in English by a member of the Depressed Classes.

Why Rajah should have chosen to enter into an agreement with B.S. Moonje rather than Gandhi, then the undisputed leader, is unclear. One reason perhaps could be the inaccessibility of the Mahatma who was imprisoned immediately on his return from the Round Table Conference. Gandhi’s known opposition to the principle of reservations on caste lines could have been another inhibiting factor. It is also possible that Moonje, who had led a Hindu Mahasabha delegation to the Round Table Conference, was projected a Hindu leader and hence may have seemed an appropriate choice to Rajah. Some press reports claimed that the initiative for the accord had come from Moonje himself (The Statesman 9-4-1932). Be that as it may, despite the stir it created, the Rajah-Moonje Pact was superseded six months later by the Poona Pact, which reiterated the agreement on reservations for the Depressed Classes with a joint electorate.

Politics of numbers

The events surrounding the Rajah-Moonje Pact spotlighted the conflicting approaches to the problem of the Depressed Classes throughout colonial rule. The British, preoccupied with the political dimension, were from the time of the first decennial census in 1871-72. “obsessed” with the question whether Untouchables could properly be classified as Hindus (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 27-29). Though no specific guidelines were issued during the 1881, 1891 and 1901 census operations, Census Superintendents like Denzil Ibbetson made efforts to collect data on selected castes and tribes. In 1901, the Census Commissioner of India, H. H. Risley, introduced the principle of social precedence for the classification of castes. At the time of the 1911 Census clear instructions were given to officials, “to enumerate the castes and tribes returned or classed as Hindus who do not conform to certain (religious) standards or are subject to certain disabilities.” The reference was undoubtedly to the untouchables (Gupta 1985: 36-40).

By then, attempts to de-link the Depressed Classes from Hindu society were considerably under way. A memorandum presented to Lord Minto in 1906 by a deputation of Muslims, and drafted as per the suggestions of his private secretary (Hardy 1972:156-157), had argued that, “The Mahommedans of India number, according to the census taken in the year 1901…between one-fifth and one-fourth of the total population of His Majesty’s Indian Dominions, and if a reduction be made for the uncivilized portions of the community enumerated under the heads of animist and other minor religions, as well as for those classes who are ordinarily classified as Hindus but properly speaking are not Hindus at all, the proportion of Mahommedans to the Hindu majority becomes much larger” (Gopal 1964: 330).

Dr. Ambedkar himself commented on Muslim attempts to use the Depressed Classes to reduce the numerical strength of Hindus. “The Muslims,” he said, “have always been looking at the Depressed Classes with a sense of longing and much of the jealously between Hindus and Muslims arises out of the fear of the latter that the former might become stronger by assimilating the Depressed Classes. In 1909 the Muslims took the bold step of suggesting that the Depressed Classes should not be enrolled as Hindus” (Ambedkar 1946: 235).

The declaration on 20 August 1917, on the goal of British policy in India, gave a fillip to the politics of numbers. Lala Lajpat Rai observed that after the announcement “a great political capital” was made of the Depressed Classes and their number arbitrarily increased (Rai 1928: 100). “In 1917”, he stated “…the total population classed according to the list in the Quinquennial Education Report as depressed amounted to around 31 million persons…Since then the number has swollen, and in the report of 1921 itself the total figures mount up to nearly 52.7 millions… But the Census Commissioner guesses that the number may be between 55 and 60 millions” (Rai 1928: 96-97).

The British did not stray from their course in subsequent years. In 1932, when the issue of Depressed Class representation had created a crisis, Sir Frederick Sykes, Governor of Bombay Presidency, reaffirmed the long-term British policy to draw the Depressed Classes into the political process and thence separate them from Hindu society. In a letter to the Viceroy, Lord Willingdon, on 7 June 1932, he stated. “I consider that for political purposes the depressed classes should be considered as a community distinct from the Hindus and their representation should be treated as a subtraction from the Hindu vote” (Shourie 1998: 233).

Social reality

The social reality was, however, at variance with colonial requirements. The untouchables were local, at best, regional groups unconnected with one another. In an attempt to artificially transform them into an all-India community, the British, around 1901, floated the term “Depressed Classes” which was picked up by English educated caste Hindu reformers, who found it less repugnant than the term “untouchables.” Depressed Class leaders, however, described the term as “degrading and unacceptable.” Ambedkar suggested “non-caste Hindus,” “protestant Hindus,” “excluded castes,” “non-conformist Hindus” and “exterior castes” as alternatives. He himself preferred the last term because “it

defines exactly the position of the untouchables who are within the Hindu religion but outside the Hindu society…” (Gupta 1985: 32). The All India Depressed Classes Association recommended the term “Adi- Hindu.”

Besides lack of unanimity on nomenclature, there was also uncertainty about the groups to be included in the category of Depressed Classes. A resolution moved in the Imperial Legislative Council in 1916 by M.B. Dadabhoy on measures to ameliorate the conditions of the Depressed Classes raised the question of the criteria to be adopted for determining backwardness. Rai Sahib Babu Rama Charana, member of the United Provinces Franchise Committee, observed that the tenor of discussions in the Imperial Legislative Council implied that the Depressed Classes included criminal and wandering tribes, aboriginal tribes and untouchables (Gupta 1985:8-9).

Efforts to identify depressed groups proved inconclusive. The Director of the Census of India for 1921 observed. ” It has been usual in recent years to speak of certain sections of the community as the ‘Depressed Classes.’ So far as I am aware the term has no final definition, nor is it certain exactly whom it covers” (Gupta 1985: 11).

A meeting of the Superintendents of Census Operations in January 1931, on the eve of the decennial exercise, noted that, “No specific definition of depressed castes was framed and no more precise instructions were issued to the Superintendents of Census Operations, because it was realized that conditions varied so much from province to province and from district to district, even, within some provinces, that it would be unwise to tie down the Superintendents of Census Operations with too meticulous instructions” (Gupta 1985: 15).

A questionnaire distributed by C. H. Lothian, Chairman of the Indian Franchise Committee in 1932 asked, “What communities would you include as belonging to depressed classes? Would you include classes other than untouchables. if so which?” (Gupta 1985:16). M.G. Hallett, Secretary to the Government of India, in a telegram to the Viceroy on 21-8- 1932, also admitted that “the depressed classes have not yet been defined and…possibly in some provinces there will be no such cases” (N.A.I.: File 31/113/32-Poll and unprinted K- W Series 1-59).

Ambedkar, in his note to the Indian Franchise Committee was emphatic that the application of the literal test of untouchability would be viewed as an attempt to reduce the strength of the depressed classes. He regarded it erroneous to exclude from the category those Untouchables who had taken to cleaner occupations or become comparatively rich. For, he asserted, “Once an untouchable always an untouchable has been the rule of Hindu social life” (Gupta 1985:16-18). Hindu reformers

In contrast to the British stress on politics and numbers. Hindu reformers beginning with Dayanand Saraswati viewed untouchability as a social problem, internal to Hindu society. The Indian Review, a nationalist journal published from Madras, carried a series of articles on the subject between 1909 and 1911 by leading reformers, including Sayajirao Gaikwad of Baroda, G. A. Natesan, T. V. Seshgiri Aiyer and Lala Lajpat Rai. Several English educated caste Hindus set up Depressed Class associations in the provinces. Narayanrao Chandavarkar and Vitthal Ramji Shinde, for instance, founded the Depressed Classes Mission in Bombay Presidency in 1906. The Baroda ruler organized a conference attended, among others, by Bipin Chandra Pal, Vitthalbhai Patel and Lokmanya Tilak, where the demand for the removal of untouchability was made.

Gandhi, who after his return from South Africa in January 1915 dedicated himself to the eradication of the practice. emphasized the moral and religious dimensions of the problem, in comparison to which the political issue “dwindles into insignificance” (Pyarelal 1932: 100). In a letter to the British Prime Minister from Yeravda Jail protesting the Communal Award’s grant of separate electorates to the Depressed Classes, he wrote, “Do you realize that if your decision stands and the constitution comes into being, you arrest the marvelous growth of the work of Hindu reformers, who have dedicated themselves to the uplift of their suppressed brethren in every walk of life?” (Gandhi 1972 vol. LI: 29-30). Gandhi continued to bring his “genuine moral passion” to the campaign against untouchability to the very end (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 107). After 1917, however, with the visit of the Secretary of State, Lord Montague, to India in preparation for the next phase of constitutional reforms, the issue of Depressed Class representation in the future political arrangements became predominant.

Joint versus separate electorates

A central issue was whether the Depressed Classes should be granted franchise in a joint electorate with Hindus or through separate electorates a la the Muslims. In an initial articulation of views, Narayanrao Chandavarkar, at a meeting organized by the Depressed Classes Mission in Bombay in November 1917 around the time of the Secretary of State’s visit, demanded reservation of seats according to population strength for the Depressed Classes (Zelliot 1988: 183-184). Though unintended, this was a furtherance of the British objective of politicizing the problem of untouchability and according a separate political identity to the Depressed Classes.

The debate however formally commenced in 1919 when the Franchise (Southborough) Committee, entrusted with determining the electoral franchise under the Montague- Chelmsford Reforms, invited members of Depressed Class associations to present their views. B. R. Ambedkar, the sole

Depressed Class graduate in Bombay Presidency, also expressed a desire to testify before the Committee (Khairmode 1955 vol. II: 277). He advised the British to “either… reserve seats…for those minorities that can not, otherwise, secure personal representation or grant communal electorates” (Ambedkar 1989 vol. I: 247-280). In a supplementary written statement, he pressed for a “community electorate” for the Depressed Classes (Ambedkar 1989 vol. I: 270-273). Fellow Mahar, GA Gawai, made a similar presentation (Zelliot 1970: 40). Vitthal Ramji Shinde recommended reserved seats for the Depressed Classes in the general constituencies.

In its ruling, the Southborough Committee proclaimed that, “we intend to make the best arrangement we can for their (the Depressed Classes) representation, in order that they too may ultimately learn the lesson of self-protection” (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 99). The Government of India Act of 1919 conceded the Depressed Classes one nominated member in the Bombay Legislative Council.

Almost a decade later, as part of an exercise mandatory every ten years, the seven-member Simon Commission was constituted to ascertain Indian opinion on further constitutional advance. While sixteen of the eighteen Depressed Class associations that appeared before the Commission were inclined towards separate electorates (Zelliot 1970: 45), Ambedkar, on behalf of the Bahishkrit Hitkarni Sabha he founded in 1924, made an unambiguous plea for universal suffrage and a joint electorate with reservation of seats. He argued,

“Assuming… that separate interests do exist, the question is, are they better promoted by separate electorates than by general electorates and reserved seats? My emphatic answer is that the separate or special interests of any minority are better promoted by the system of general electorates and reserved seats than by separate electorates… this must be associations to forward to the Committee with their signatures (The Bombay Chronicle 23-2-1932). On 13 February, he wrote to G.A. Gawai, General-Secretary of the All India Depressed Classes Association, on Rajah’s deposition before the Lothian Committee in support of a joint electorate. Therein he asserted that the Lothian Committee was not authorized to discuss the question of electorates with individuals or associations and threatened “breach between us and war amongst ourselves” (The Bombay Chronicle 27-2-1932).

Meanwhile the impasse created by the Minorities Pact prompted the British Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, to ask members of the Minorities Committee to sign a requisition authorizing him to settle the issue. In a letter to the Prime Minister dated 14 November, 1931, Gandhi regretted his inability to accede to the suggestion. Expressing his opposition to any further extension of the principle of separate electorate or special statuary reservation, he said there were other ways of ensuring the election of deserving candidates through the ordinary electorate (Nayar 1996:44).

In February 1932, before the announcement of the Prime Minister’s award, came news of an agreement between M.C. Rajah and B.S. Moonje on a joint electorate with reservation of seats on population basis for the Depressed Classes. In his letter to the Prime Minister (The Hindustan Times, 25-3-32), Rajah highlighted the historic significance of the accord between “the only central organisation of the Depressed Classes” and “the organised body of Hindus, taken as a whole.” He hailed the “hand of fraternity” extended by “our co- religionists, the caste Hindus” as a pointer to their awakening social conscience.

Rajah also set forth the factors that prompted the All India Depressed Classes Association to jettison its earlier demand for separate electorates. That demand, he said, had been made at a time when power still rested with the British who could arbitrate, whenever the need arose, in the interest of the Depressed Classes. But, in the changed context of impending provincial autonomy, separate electorates would place the Depressed Classes “permanently in the opposition.” Their representatives could hope for a share in the governance of the provinces only when they merged in a common electorate and subscribed to a common political view. Rajah clarified that even a joint electorate with reservation of seats was “a temporary expedient” till the Depressed Classes, which were an integral constituent of Hindu society, were able to stand on their own.

Writing to the Viceroy (3-6-1932), Thaware, a Mahar leader from Nagpur, pointed out that before finalizing the agreement the consent of the Working Committee of the All India Depressed Classes Association and other Depressed Class leaders had been obtained. Ambedkar, by contrast, appeared to have secured the approval of only R. Srinivasan. Moreover, while the Minorities Pact granted the Depressed Classes 59 seats less than their share and the Provincial Governments in their recommendations to the Indian Franchise Committee proposed still fewer seats, the Rajah-Moonje Pact gave the Depressed Classes 185 seats in the provincial legislatures, 38 in the Upper Chamber and 57 in the Lower Chamber.

Support for Rajah-Moonje Pact

Meanwhile, the Viceroy, in his communication to the Secretary of State (5-3-1932), noted the considerable endorsement Rajah-Moonje Pact had received in the Hindu press. The Hindustan Times (29-2-1932), while welcoming the resolution of the Working Committee of the All India Depressed Classes Association in favour of a joint electorate, regretted its failure to present a fighting programme. “And it was a fighting programme that the All India Depressed Classes Association should have devised, in consideration of the serious nature of the disruptive forces that have been released by Dr. Ambedkar and his following, however small or insignificant they might be.” Dr. Ambedkar, it stated, “has followed his own methods and convictions regardless of the major interests of those he claims to represent… (He) is tenaciously attempting to communalise the depressed classes for all practical purposes, for all time to come, thereby perpetuating the stigma of untouchability on its brow…”

The Indian Daily Mail (9-3-1932) held that Dr. Ambedkar “wants to give statutory sanction to the ‘Depressed Classes’ so that he can raise himself to eminence on their humiliations. To relegate these classes permanently to the backwaters of Hinduism, would not only be a blunder but a gross crime which every Indian, to whatever community he may belong, ought not to countenance for a moment.”

The Bombay Chronicle (2-4-1932), commented that Dr. Ambedkar was “audacious enough” to claim that the Depressed Classes had repudiated the Rajah-Moonje Pact and that the All India Depressed Classes Association was a paper organization. This contention, it stated, was so extravagant that it did not merit discussion. The paper noted that 145 associations had endorsed a memorandum in favour of a joint electorate submitted to the Franchise (Lothian) Committee by B.J. Deorukhkar and other leaders. The All India Depressed Classes Association, it further pointed out, had been recognized for the past six-seven years as one of the largest, if not the largest, organization of the Depressed Classes and had a membership of roughly 40,000 (Sources 1982 vol. I: 75-76).

Newspapers reported (Leader 23-3-1932) that Lord Lothian, Chairman of the Franchise Committee, and his colleagues were struck by the enthusiasm for the Rajah- Moonje Pact among the Depressed Classes. They were particularly impressed by the pro-Pact procession in Bombay.